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RACE, REFORM, & PROGRESSIVE
PROSECUTION
DANIEL FRYER*
The progressive prosecution movement is one of the most recent efforts
to reform the United States criminal justice system. In this Article, I analyze
two assumptions that appear to be guiding this movement. The first is that
prosecutors have unilateral power to change the system. The second is that
those who bear the biggest burden of our current system—black Americans—
would be the primary beneficiaries of the decarceration proposals advanced
by progressive prosecutors. I argue that each of these assumptions is
misguided. A successful criminal justice reform movement must recognize
the contingent power of prosecutors and actively seek to advance racial
justice on top of its decarceration efforts. To avoid exacerbating the
problems they intend to correct, reformists must reexamine the principles
underlying the movement and the aims they expect to achieve.
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INTRODUCTION
Whatever else one might think about prosecutors, it is generally
believed that they hold the power to right the wrongs of our criminal justice
system. For example, while discussing a political action committee (PAC)
created to help reform-minded prosecutors win elections, the activist Shaun
King commented: “No position in America, no single individual has a bigger
impact on the criminal justice system—including police brutality, but the
whole crisis of mass incarceration in general—than your local district
attorney . . . . They are the gatekeepers of America’s justice system.”1
Similarly, Danielle Sered, the executive director of the alternative-toincarceration program Common Justice,2 noted: “[m]ass incarceration is
made or broken by a bunch of assistant D.A.s and their supervisors and the
decisions they make between 10:00 a.m. and noon.”3 And, of course, one
cannot forget President Obama’s recommendation to those dissatisfied with
our criminal justice system: “If you are really concerned about how the
criminal justice system treats African-Americans, the best way to protest is
to vote . . . . Do what they just did in Philadelphia and Boston, and elect
state’s attorneys and district attorneys who are looking at issues in a new
light.”4
These sorts of statements are common in discussions about criminal
justice reform. The message they convey is obvious: if you want to end the
1
Daniel Marans, Black Activist Starts Group That Aims to Elect Progressive Prosecutors,
HUFFPOST (Feb. 15, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/black-activist-electprogressive-prosecutors_n_5a85b64ee4b0058d55670e4f [https://perma.cc/ZCS5-BUPG].
2
Executive Director, COMMON JUSTICE, https://www.commonjustice.org/danielle_sered_
staff [https://perma.cc/J96Y-HPEW].
3
EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 99 (2019) (quoting Danielle Sered).
4
Read Obama’s Full Speech from the University of Illinois, NBC CHICAGO (updated Sept.
8, 2018, 7:05 AM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/obama-universityofillinois-full-speech-492719531.html [https://perma.cc/H4MG-BF52] [hereinafter Obama’s
Full Speech].
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problems of our criminal justice system—such as mass incarceration and
racial injustice—get prosecutors on your side. Since “[t]he American
prosecutor rules the criminal justice system, exercising almost limitless
discretion and virtually absolute power,”5 prosecutors should be able to
unilaterally correct its wrongs. Or, as Professor Angela J. Davis puts it: “just
as the power and discretion of prosecutors have contributed to mass
incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal justice system, that same
power and discretion may be used to institute reforms to correct these
injustices.”6 Thus, if we are really concerned with how the criminal justice
system treats black people, the message of what we should do is abundantly
clear: vote for the right prosecutors.
If these responses to the oppressive aspects of our system of criminal
justice strike you as too simple to be true, you are right—they are too simple
to be true. Our penal society is shaped by longstanding stereotypes of black
criminality,7 a complex relationship between racial capitalism and carceral
punishment,8 and a general desire to promote white supremacy.9 Thus,
although the recent movement of “progressive prosecution” is lauded as the
solution to the flaws of our system, we may be skeptical about the potential
reach of these prosecutors who are viewing issues in a new light. This is not
to say that the movement isn’t promising. Yet endorsements encouraging
those “concerned about how the criminal justice system treats AfricanAmericans”10 to focus their energy on electing prosecutors should be met
with caution. The first thing to note is that these proposals often rely on
exaggerated claims about prosecutors’ power and naïve statements about the
potential to limit such power. To the extent prosecutors have a lot of power,
it is because other actors permit them to have it. Despite claims to the
5

David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 473, 480–81 (2016) [hereinafter Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
6
Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement, 3 UCLA
CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1, 5 (2019) [hereinafter Davis, Reimagining Prosecution].
7
See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 3 (2010) (“Rather, the problem was racial
criminalization: the stigmatization of crime as ‘black’ and the masking of crime among whites
as individual failure.”).
8
See Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (2019)
(“[T]oday’s carceral punishment system can be traced back to slavery and the racial capitalist
regime it relied on and sustained.”).
9
See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Costs of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1296 (2004) (“Mass incarceration seems to
verify stereotypes about black criminality that originated in slavery and are part of a belief
system premised on the superiority of whites and inferiority of blacks.”).
10
Obama’s Full Speech, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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contrary, our justice system is not set up as one ruled by a “prosecutor king”11
who “answer[s] to no one else.”12 The second thing to note is that reformminded prosecutors rarely articulate methods to address the specific racial
harms of the criminal justice system. Instead, they often articulate neutral
principles that are susceptible to being used in a racially discriminatory
manner. Thus, the ones we expect to be the obvious beneficiaries of a reform
movement—black Americans—have the potential to bear the biggest burden.
These are bold claims. And in the pages that follow I will try to unpack
them. My task here is not one of criticism (full disclosure: in 2018 I joined
the first class of assistant district attorneys hired as part of Philadelphia
District Attorney Larry Krasner’s “campaign to end mass incarceration”13),
but rather to consider some underlying assumptions that appear to be guiding
a promising reform movement. We are unlikely to make substantial progress
in our reform efforts unless we examine the principles underlying the
movement and the aims it expects to achieve. Too often, promising reform
efforts improve community perceptions of criminal justice without actually
improving criminal justice.14 Indeed, sometimes liberal reform efforts15
exacerbate problems they intend to correct.16 My purpose here, then, is to
See generally Erik Luna, Prosecutor King, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 48 (2014)
(comparing the American prosecutor to Plato’s philosopher king).
12
BAZELON, supra note 3, at xxvi.
13
See Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasnerscampaign-to-end-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/NRZ2-KBZB].
14
See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425 (2016) [hereinafter Butler, Limits of
Criminal Justice Reform] (“‘[S]uccessful’ reform efforts substantially improve community
perceptions about the police without substantially improving police practices.”).
15
Of course, the prosecutorial reform movement is not merely liberal. Its scope is wide:
“It has roots in civil rights history, the Black Lives Matter campaign against violence and
racism, libertarian skepticism of government overreach, and conservative concerns about
waste and spending.” BAZELON, supra note 3, at xxvii. However, I focus on liberals here
because of their history of advocating against prosecutorial power, mass incarceration, and
racial injustice. Moreover, I interpret liberalism in the “philosophical sense that encompasses
a group of related” social and political doctrines. SAMUEL FREEMAN, LIBERALISM AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 2 (2018) (discussing the history of liberal theory). Since I am more
interested in the moral underpinnings of the issues and less interested in the economic
rationale, my focus is not so much on advocates for reform based on the financial burden of
mass incarceration and racial injustice. Indeed, given that the movement to reform prosecutors
is often viewed as heterogeneous, it is more vulnerable to overlooking professed liberal
goals—such as racial justice—that are not politically viable.
16
Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 14, at 1425 (discussing examples
of problems exacerbated by reform efforts). Among the situations that Butler describes are
how “procedural protections for defendants led to harsher sentencing laws”; how “advocating
11
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point out some of the assumptions of the progressive prosecution movement
and indicate some of the areas where it is susceptible to a fate resembling
past reform efforts.
In Part I, I briefly describe what I take to be the rationale behind
reformists’ support of progressive prosecutors. In Part II, I examine the
assumption that prosecutors have unilateral power to change the system and
show why this is based on a mistaken view of prosecutorial power. Rather
than possessing the unilateral power to control the system, prosecutors
possess a contingent power that depends on other officials deferring to their
actions. In Part III, I address a second assumption—that black Americans
will be the primary beneficiaries of the policies advanced by progressive
prosecutors—and explain why it is problematic. The difficulty is not simply
aiming to reduce mass incarceration by attending to the disparities that
currently exist in the system. Instead, progressive prosecutors ought to
develop a decarceration program that actively seeks to advance racial justice
and avoids asymmetrically harming our most vulnerable populations. I
explain how ignoring the complex problems of marginalized communities
could exacerbate, not alleviate, the racial injustice in our society. I conclude
with some thoughts about moving forward. To start, though, let’s see how
we ended up here in the first place.
I. RETHINKING PROSECUTORIAL POWER
Many say the American system of prosecution is in urgent need of
reform.17 But what type of reform are we after? Conventional critiques sought
to limit prosecutorial discretion and point out its anomalous position in our
scheme of limited government.18 Sometimes the critique was made by
comparison. When assessing prosecutorial power in relation to other
powerful criminal justice officials, for example, scholars have been
straightforward in their assessment: “No government official in America has
as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.”19 This point
for race neutral policies” led to increasing race disparities; and how the Supreme Court’s
affirmation of the right to counsel for indigent persons accused of felonies legitimized mass
incarceration. Id.
17
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 510 (“American prosecutorial agencies
have long seemed, to most scholars, in urgent need of reform.”).
18
See id. at 510–11 (discussing scholarly attacks on prosecutors since the mid-twentieth
century).
19
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The
Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) [hereinafter Davis,
Prosecution and Race] (footnotes omitted) (“[Prosecutorial] discretion, which is almost
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was typically buttressed by appealing to the public’s ignorance of what goes
on in prosecutors’ offices. “Unlike judges,” David Sklansky points out,
“prosecutors generally do not announce the grounds for their decisions.”20
“And unlike the police,” he continues, “prosecutors carry out most of their
work behind closed doors.”21 Our system has observable metrics to keep
judges and police accountable for their decisions, but “[w]e have nothing like
that for prosecutors.”22
This lack of accountability might not be worrisome if prosecutors were
thought to have minimal power. But the prosecutor has long been thought to
have “more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in
America.”23 As former United States Attorney General Robert H. Jackson
put it eighty years ago:
[A prosecutor] can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can
have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations. Or
the prosecutor may choose a more subtle course and simply have a citizen’s friends
interviewed. The prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret
session, and on the basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen
to be indicted and held for trial. He may dismiss the case before trial, in which case the
defense never has a chance to be heard. Or he may go on with a public trial. If he obtains
a conviction, the prosecutor can still make recommendations as to sentence, as to
whether the prisoner should get probation or a suspended sentence, and after he is put
away, as to whether he is a fit subject for parole. While the prosecutor at his best is one
of the most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base
motives, he is one of the worst.24

Scholars still share Jackson’s view of prosecutors.25 But until a few
years ago, reformists were less likely to echo Jackson’s sentiment that this
power could be used as a “beneficent force” in our society. Given widespread
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system, prosecutorial power is
instead consistently viewed as the cause of all our problems. For instance,
some scholars complain that “prosecutors have ended up with almost
unfettered, unreviewable power to determine who gets sent to prison and for

always exercised in private, gives prosecutors more power than any other criminal justice
officials, with practically no corresponding accountability to the public they serve.”).
20
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 474.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 475.
23
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3,
3 (1940).
24
Id.
25
See Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483 (noting that Jackson’s
explanation “is the way prosecutorial power is usually described”).
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how long.”26 Others describe their ability as “the power to wreck lives, to put
people on trial, and to lock them up—in short, to create dire outcomes.”27
And Professor Paul Butler—who previously served as a prosecutor28—has
explicitly rejected the notion that “good people” should become
prosecutors.29 These sorts of statements caused one scholar to claim that
“[p]rosecutors are the Darth Vader of academic writing: mysterious,
powerful[,] and, for the most part, bad.”30
A. PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Faced with this view of prosecutorial power, David Sklansky has
explained that reformists have traditionally reacted by pursuing two paths.31
The first was to reduce prosecutors’ power by making them more accountable
to the public.32 If part of the problem is the public’s ignorance about what
goes on in prosecutors’ offices, then more transparency would allow us to
keep prosecutors accountable in the same way we hold other officials
accountable. But some worry that this approach would over-politicize
prosecutors’ actions.33 Because of the nature of the office, prosecutors
perform many activities that we may think ought to be immune from the

JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 70 (2017).
27
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483 (footnote omitted).
28
See Paul Butler, GEO. L., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/paul-butler/
[https://perma.cc/6QQS-8FLA] (“Prior to joining the academy, Professor Butler served as a
federal prosecutor with the U.S. Department of Justice, where his specialty was public
corruption.”).
29
PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (2009); see also
Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
355, 400 (2001) (“I am saying to those who are committed to social and racial justice: Please
don’t join a prosecutor’s office.”); Abbe Smith, Good Person, Good Prosecutor in 2018,
87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 3, 7 (2018) (“I would like to believe that good, well-intentioned
people who become prosecutors could bring justice back to the criminal justice system in
2018. But I doubt it.”). But see Abbe Smith, The Prosecutors I Like: A Very Short Essay,
16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 411, 421 (2019) [hereinafter Smith, “The Prosecutors I Like”] (“[M]y
hope is that Larry Krasner becomes a national leader. To my prosecution-minded students, I
say, By all means go to Philly.”).
30
Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) [hereinafter Bellin, Reassessing
Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration].
31
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 513.
32
Id.; see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 298
(2011) (“The conduct of local prosecutors needs to change as well. Two changes are crucial:
criminal prosecutions need to become more transparent, and they also must be made more
locally democratic.”).
33
See Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 518–19.
26
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political process.34 In this spirit, the second path pursued was to make
prosecutors more accountable to the law.35 To do this, reformists suggested
increased prosecutorial oversight performed by outside parties like judges or
disciplinary committees.36 In this way, prosecutors could be held accountable
while simultaneously insulating them from politics.37
Neither path was successful. “Indeed, what has changed, if anything, is
that prosecutors now have even more power.”38 It’s as though efforts to
reform prosecutors’ offices were not just unsuccessful; they were
counterproductive. This counterproductivity likely deterred efforts to
continue pursuing either of these paths to reduce prosecutorial power. And
the apparently undeterrable power of prosecutors substantially supported
declarations that “the prosecutor is the criminal justice system.”39
B. LEVERAGING PROSECUTORIAL POWER FOR REFORM

No wonder, then, that reformists have taken an “if you can’t beat them,
join them” mentality towards prosecutors. Recent efforts by reformists
dissatisfied with the criminal justice system involve pursuing a third path:
they focus not so much on reducing the power of prosecutors, but instead on
leveraging that power and helping those who are sympathetic to their agenda
win elections.40 Since “[m]uch of what is wrong with American criminal
justice—its racial inequity, its excessive severity, its propensity for error—is
increasingly blamed on prosecutors,”41 it makes sense to expect prosecutors
to get us out of this mess. The rationale is that where the traditional
prosecutor has used her power to “aggressively pursue charges in as many
cases as possible, seek high cash bail, and advocate for lengthy prison
34

See id. at 518 (“[C]andor might make it harder for prosecutors to carry out some of their
work as intermediaries.”).
35
Id. at 513.
36
Id. at 512–13.
37
Id. at 513 (describing this second path as “often . . . motivated in part by a desire to
insulate prosecutors from politics”). Despite the attempt to use judicial oversight as a tool for
prosecutorial reform, Sklansky notes, “[j]udicial review of charging decisions and plea
bargains remain[ed] virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 515.
38
Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 921 (2009); see also Sklansky, Prosecutorial
Power, supra note 5, at 514–15.
39
Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413,
1415 (2010).
40
Of course, Sklansky is aware of this third path. He discusses it in a subsequent essay
while noting that “[d]istrict attorney races are going off script.” David A. Sklansky, The
Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 647
(2017) (documenting the recent election of progressive prosecutors).
41
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 474.
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sentences,”42 the progressive prosecutor “instead could use her power and
discretion to institute policies and practices that would reduce the
incarceration rate and unwarranted racial disparities.”43
Although the number of progressive prosecutors elected to office has
been modest,44 the support from reformists dissatisfied with the criminal
justice system has been robust. In recognition of these changing times, the
editorial board of the New York Times has claimed that “the best chance for
continued reform lies with state and local prosecutors who are open to
rethinking how they do their enormously influential jobs.”45 The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which does not officially endorse political
candidates, played a role in helping Philadelphia District Attorney Larry
Krasner get elected.46 Color of Change, a PAC that focuses on African
American civil rights, backed various progressive prosecutors across the
country in 2018.47 Black activists created a PAC with the purpose of helping
“reform-minded” prosecutors win local elections.48 And many prosecutors
across the nation running on a progressive platform have received financial
support from George Soros, who has been described as a billionaire
“[c]riminal justice reform activist[].”49 Indeed, even Supreme Court Justice
Sonia Sotomayor, who the New York Times has described as “tak[ing] on the

42

Davis, Reimagining Prosecution, supra note 6, at 5.
Id.
44
See BAZELON, supra note 3, at xxix (“It’s not clear yet whether the movement to
transform American prosecution will be equal to the challenge—whether it will spread beyond
a few dozen D.A.’s offices, and thus impact incarceration on a national scale.”).
45
Editorial Board, A Wiser Generation of Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/opinion/a-wiser-generation-of-prosecutors.html
[https://perma.cc/7HQU-MBQR].
46
Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The A.C.L.U. Is Getting Involved in Elections—and
Reinventing Itself for the Trump Era, NEW YORKER (June 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.c
om/news/news-desk/the-aclu-is-getting-involved-in-elections-and-reinventing-itself-for-thetrump-era [https://perma.cc/QG6T-BQLU] (noting that the A.C.L.U. made a small investment
in Philadelphia’s district attorney race by, among other things, helping to send formerly
incarcerated persons door to door to discuss the brutality of prison).
47
Christopher Connelly, National Advocacy Groups Back Candidates to Challenge Local
Prosecutors, NPR (Apr. 10, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/10/598440346/
national-advocacy-groups-back-candidates-to-challenge-local-prosecutors
[https://perma.cc/FJX9-HDNX].
48
Marans, supra note 1.
49
Justin Jouvenal & Rachel Weiner, Money from PAC Funded by George Soros Shakes
Up Prosecutor Races in Northern Virginia, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/money-from-pac-funded-by-georgesoros-shakes-up-prosecutors-races-in-northern-virginia/2019/04/23/5c754d14-6513-11e9a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html [https://perma.cc/7D5Q-QE6L].
43
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criminal justice system,”50 has gotten in on the action by celebrating a recent
progressive prosecutor elected in San Francisco.51 Thus, what we have are
actors who have traditionally worked to make progressive changes to the
criminal justice system instead looking to prosecutors to take charge in
criminal justice reform efforts.
There’s a lot more to say here, but I’m not trying to provide a history of
the movement. The point is to appreciate the motivation to advance a
prosecutor-centered reform movement. Thus, I want to convey a quick sense
of why reformists are so eager to get on board with a movement that appears
inconsistent with their past efforts. And not much ink needs to be spilled to
explain why: prosecutors’ power.
II. PROSECUTORIAL POWER: CONTINGENT, NOT UNILATERAL
A. EXAGGERATING PROSECUTORIAL POWER

This brings us to the first assumption: that prosecutors have unilateral
power to change the criminal justice system. The progressive prosecution
movement seems to rely on this assumption.52 And most reformists endorse
the proposition that prosecutors “answer to no one else and make most of the
key decisions in the case.”53 Thus, reformists say things like, “[t]he power of
the D.A. makes him or her the actor—the only actor—who can start to fix
what’s broken without changing a single law.”54 The thought is that if
prosecutors are the criminal justice system, then once a reform-minded
prosecutor takes office “the system’s injustices should melt away.”55
This is understandable—to a point. The idea is based on closely related,
commonplace exaggerations of prosecutorial power. If the various quotes
above failed to convey this point, here’s the essayist Adam Gopnik:
“[Prosecutors] really hold all the effective power, reporting to no one save

50

Adam Liptak, In Dissents, Sonia Sotomayor Takes On the Criminal Justice System,
N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/us/politics/in-dissents-sonia
-sotomayor-takes-on-the-criminal-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/L982-VJ44].
51
Mark Joseph Stern, Sonia Sotomayor Celebrates San Francisco’s New Progressive
District Attorney, SLATE (Jan. 9, 2020, 7:12 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020
/01/chesa-boudin-sonia-sotomayor-san-francisco-district-attorney.html
[https://perma.cc/XL4G-WC2A].
52
See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
53
BAZELON, supra note 3, at xxvi.
54
Id. at xxvii.
55
Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 174–75 (2019)
[hereinafter Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors].
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God, or their own ambition.”56 Here’s Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan:
“Prosecutors are the ‘Leviathan’ in our criminal justice system.”57 And here’s
Judge Jed S. Rakoff, himself a former prosecutor, speaking somewhat
begrudgingly: “[F]or the immediate future at least, prosecutors, rather than
judges, will be the real rulers of the American criminal justice system.”58
There is no shortage of claims like this from commentators.59 And the
consensus on this point has led one scholar to conclude that “[n]o serious
observer disputes that prosecutors drive sentencing and hold most of the
power in the United States criminal justice system.”60
B. THE CONTINGENT POWER OF PROSECUTORS

Well, let’s be unserious observers for the moment. Sometimes we have
to play the role of a “weirdo or an eccentric” to conduct a thorough
examination of issues.61 The topic I want to focus on here is whether
reformists are right to think prosecutors have the ability to independently
create the sort of reform they seek. But before we get there, note that the view
that prosecutors do not hold most of the power in the criminal justice system
is not so weird. Since contact with other officials in the criminal justice
system is often procedurally antecedent to prosecutors, it makes intuitive
sense that these other officials hold more power than prosecutors. For
example, police are “first movers” who typically have to make a decision
before prosecutors get involved.62 And legislatures could prevent cases from
56
Adam Gopnik, How We Misunderstand Mass Incarceration, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/10/how-we-misunderstand-mass-inca
rceration [https://perma.cc/HPX6-4PNQ].
57
Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors: Elected and Agency
Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and Child Protection
Cases, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 743, 757 (2018).
58
Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What Can Be
Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2017).
59
For a very impressive list of broad assertions about prosecutor’s power, discretion, and
primacy, see Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 176–211 (pointing out the
oversimplified claims about prosecutorial power).
60
Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should the Prosecutors
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 677–78 (2016). The one exception that
Gershowitz noted as not sharing this view was the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 678
n.6 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978)) (noting that prosecutors and
defense attorneys “arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power”).
61
JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF LOCKE’S
POLITICAL THOUGHT 4 (2002) (“In philosophy generally one sometimes has to pretend to be a
weirdo; one has to pretend to take seriously the possibility that the sun will not rise tomorrow
in order to address problems like induction, causation, the regularity of nature, and the reality
of the external world.”).
62
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 191–92.
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falling on prosecutors’ desks by decriminalizing conduct.63 Indeed, even
Jackson’s account64 of prosecutorial power was contingent on prosecutors’
ability to make recommendations that others—police, juries, judges, and
parole boards—follow.65 Ordering arrests, presenting cases to the grand jury,
one-sided presentation of facts, and recommending sentences do not mean
anything if other criminal justice actors do not respond. “[P]rosecutor[s] get[]
law enforcement officers to investigate, magistrates to issue warrants, grand
juries to indict, defendants to plead guilty (or, if necessary, trial juries to
convict), and judges to imprison.”66 So, although it is often assumed that
prosecutors have unilateral power,67 “when you think about it, pretty much
everything a prosecutor does is done through others.”68 Rather than viewing
prosecutors as having unilateral power to affect mass incarceration and racial
justice, it instead appears that prosecutors have a contingent power—that is,
one that is dependent on other criminal justice officials assisting them in
attaining their goals.
Does it follow that prosecutors do not “hold most of the power in the
United States criminal justice system?”69 It depends. “Power” is a notoriously
elusive concept, and there is no consensus on how best to define it.70
Statements about prosecutorial power are often lumped together in a way that
makes it unclear whether scholars are discussing prosecutorial discretion (the
decision not to exercise control), prosecutorial influence (the capacity to
influence other officials), or prosecutorial primacy (the power prosecutors
have relative to other officials). Indeed, sometimes scholars make no effort

63

Id. at 198–203.
See Jackson, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
65
See Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483 (citing Jackson, supra note 23,
at 3); see also David Garland, The Road to Ending Mass Incarceration Goes Through the
DA’s Office, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 8, 2019), https://prospect.org/justice/road-ending-massincarceration-goes-da-s-office/ [https://perma.cc/R776-CX3T] (“Prosecutors bring charges,
propose bail, shape plea deals, and specify penalties with little effective resistance from
defense attorneys, grand juries, or judges.”).
66
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483.
67
See, e.g., Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law:
Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 28 (2009) (describing “[t]he
executive’s power to make all prosecutorial decisions unilaterally”); Sklansky, Prosecutorial
Power, supra note 5, at 488 (“Concerns about prosecutorial discretion are concerns about the
ability of individual prosecutors, or their offices, to exercise their power unilaterally, without
checks by other government officials.”); Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in
Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (“[The] enormous power [of]
prosecutors . . . . is tantamount to unilateral power over sentencing.”).
68
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483.
69
See Gershowitz, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
70
Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 482.
64
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whatsoever to be clear about what they are referring to when they are
discussing prosecutorial power, stating things such as: “prosecutors have
awesome powers.”71 This lack of clarity is problematic for any reform
movement dependent on prosecutorial power. This is especially true where
“[r]eformers assign prosecutors the awesome task of unilaterally reversing
the actions of other criminal justice actors.”72 A progressive prosecution
movement that incorrectly depicts prosecutorial power is bound to fail. But
a recognition of prosecutors’ contingent power forces us to recognize the
other officials that enable this prosecutorial power.
C. ANOTHER LOOK AT PROSECUTORIAL POWER

This last thought could be developed in a few ways. One view calls out
scholars for their lack of precision and shows why the contingency feature of
prosecutorial power makes prosecutors the least—not most—promising
sources of reform. This view reassesses the story about prosecutorial power
that is plaguing the legal academy and provides an explanation for why
prosecutors are not the true causes of mass incarceration.73 It then explains
how legislatures, police, and judges are more powerful than prosecutors, and
it contends that those inclined towards reform may realize the best solution
would be to target those other officials, not prosecutors.
In a recent set of articles, Jeffrey Bellin has propounded just such a
view.74 Bellin writes that “a flawed academic consensus enabled by a
puzzling lack of dissent,” led to “today’s prosecutorial-power rhetoric [that]
is, upon close examination, frustratingly incoherent.”75 “This blinkered
approach,” Bellin claims, “overlooks the powerful forces that can and do
constrain prosecutors and diverts attention from the most promising sources
of lasting reform, like legislators, judges, and police, to the least.”76 Rather
than being the drivers of mass incarceration, “[a]ll prosecutors can do by
71

H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a
Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (2013).
72
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 175.
73
Contra PFAFF, supra note 26, at 127–59 (discussing prosecutors’ role in mass
incarceration).
74
See generally Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (2020)
[hereinafter Bellin, Theories of Prosecution] (advancing a theory of prosecution that shifts the
perception of the prosecutorial role from an “advocate of justice” to a “servant of the law”);
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 187–203 (arguing prosecutors are not the
most powerful actors in the criminal justice system); Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power
Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, supra note 30, at 838 (critiquing the “caricature of
prosecutors that pervades the legal academy”).
75
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 174.
76
Id. at 212.
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themselves is let people off—a tactic that does not lend itself to filling
prisons.”77 Mirroring Jackson’s recognition from eighty years ago, Bellin
writes that “[a] prosecutor cannot put anyone in prison without the direct
assistance of legislators, police, and judges, and the indirect acquiescence of
governors, parole boards, and grand and petit juries.”78 Therefore, Bellin
concludes, “[c]ontrary to the consensus, prosecutors are not the most
powerful actors in the criminal justice system.”79 Rather than being the
leaders of our reform efforts, “[p]rosecutors, for the most part, dutifully
implement the[] commands” of other officials.80 “Reforms that myopically
focus on prosecutors who ‘rule the system’ overlook that dynamic,
jeopardizing their long-term efficacy.”81 The lesson to take, then, is that
prosecutors are the wrong targets for a criminal justice reform project.
Instead of following the popular recommendations of looking to prosecutors
to lead reform, Bellin suggests that reformers should not be discouraged from
“the more natural focus on decriminalization and sentencing reform”82 and
should use their resources to concentrate on the traditional targets of criminal
justice reform: legislators, police, and judges.83
I don’t want to make too much of this argument. Bellin’s work should
be applauded for highlighting the lack of precision in which scholars discuss
prosecutorial power and disclosing the caricature of prosecutors that plagues
the legal academy. But he reaches conclusions about prosecutorial power
using questionable methods and covertly sets up his analysis in a way that is
unfavorable to assessing prosecutors’ contingent power. For starters, Bellin
grounds his analysis on Max Weber’s theory of power, which views power
as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a
position to carry out his own will despite resistance.”84 This stacks the deck
against the contingent power prosecutors possess, which is inherently derived
from the assistance of others. A more charitable assessment of prosecutorial
77
Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
supra note 30, at 857.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 845.
80
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 200.
81
Id. at 211.
82
Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
supra note 30, at 853.
83
See Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 174–75 (reporting that
misunderstandings about prosecutorial preeminence have inspired “criminal justice reformers
[to] divert energy and resources from traditional targets (legislatures and judges) to local
district attorney elections”).
84
Id. at 175 (quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 53 (1956)).
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power would instead proceed under a theory of “social power” (“the ability
of an actor deliberately to change the incentive structure of another actor or
actors to bring about, or help bring about outcomes”),85 or “outcome power”
(“the ability of an actor to bring about or help to bring about outcomes”).86
Indeed, since social power is sometimes described as the “standard theory of
power,”87 it would make obvious sense that many scholars have this theory
in mind when they are referring to prosecutorial power—not Weber’s theory.
In addition, Bellin overlooks that line prosecutors are beholden to the
lead prosecutor in a way that individual legislators and judges are not. When
arguing that prosecutors have less power than other officials, Bellin’s
analysis focuses on how these officials act collectively. As he puts it, “[i]f a
claim of prosecutorial power depends on the actions of all prosecutors in a
given jurisdiction, the equivalent comparison is to all of that jurisdiction’s
police, judges, or legislators.”88 But this point fails to appreciate that line
prosecutors have an obligation to advance the policies of the elected
prosecutor. Individual judges and legislators, on the other hand, operate with
a certain level of independence. Thus, when analyzing whether reformists
should focus on electing prosecutors, it may be more accurate to assess
prosecutorial primacy by comparing how much power these elected officials
will have relative to other officials operating individually in the criminal
justice system—not as a collective.89
Finally, Bellin sometimes overvalues the role that judges may have in
decreasing the problems of the criminal justice system. This is perhaps most
clear when Bellin analyzes John Pfaff’s hypothetical about “[a] drug-

85
KEITH DOWDING, RATIONAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL POWER 48 (1991); Sklansky,
Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483 n.55.
86
DOWDING, supra note 85, at 48; Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483
n.55.
87
John C. Turner, Explaining the Nature of Power: A Three-Process Theory, 35 EUR. J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2005); Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 483 n.55.
88
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 189.
89
Two points are worth noting here. First, Bellin’s argument would still hold when
considering the power that a police chief of a jurisdiction has in comparison to the power an
elected prosecutor has in the jurisdiction. Second, although judges are not beholden to any
individual judge (as line prosecutors are), it could be argued that lower court judges are, in
some way, beholden to the decisions of the higher court. That is, one could argue that trial and
intermediate appellate courts are beholden to the supreme court of a jurisdiction. Still, the
supreme courts are going to be comprised of multiple judges (or justices) and not an individual
official that must be followed. In addition, given that appellate court opinions often leave room
for interpretation, these opinions are unlikely to operate as a significant restraint on lower
court judges.
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addicted twenty-year-old arrested for the first time and accused of stealing a
laptop.”90 Pfaff poses the quandary as follows:
A second-year prosecutor, just a few years out of law school, is handed a case involving
a drug-addicted twenty-year-old arrested for the first time and accused of stealing a
laptop to sell for drug money. Does the prosecutor charge this as a felony or a
misdemeanor? Does he require the defendant to plead guilty but divert him to a drug
court for treatment? Should he decline to charge at all as long as the defendant enters
drug treatment outside the criminal justice system? The array of choices available to a
prosecutor at the start of a case is dizzying in its complexity, and there are so many
ways—both in terms of excess severity and leniency—for the prosecutor to get it
wrong.91

Denying that prosecutorial leniency is an adequate solution, Bellin
criticizes the recommendation for “prosecutors to circumvent felony-theft
laws (and judges aching to impose prison terms) by charging theft defendants
with loitering.”92 He instead insists that a better alternative would be to
“convince judges who impose theft sentences to recognize that a prison term
is unwarranted.”93
Although Bellin’s resolution may be more honest, it does not address
the fact that Pfaff’s defendant would still have a felony on his record even if
he were to avoid incarceration. In the long run, this may reduce his chances
of employment, extend the time he is under the state’s control, and increase
the chance he would end up incarcerated later on.94 It may be better, then, for
reformists to advance policies that do not rely significantly on judges, whose
options are often limited.95 Reformists may want to intervene before the case
gets to a judge.
90

Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
supra note 30, at 853 (quoting PFAFF, supra note 26, at 212–13).
91
PFAFF, supra note 26, at 212–13.
92
Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
supra note 30, at 855.
93
Id.
94
For a general account of the consequences that a felony may have on one’s life, see
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 137–72 (2010) (discussing collateral
consequences of incarceration).
95
To a certain extent, even Bellin seems to recognize this. He notes that “[t]he best way”
to avoid the disastrous outcome is to have the legislature “raise the statutory threshold for
felony theft.” Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, supra note 30, at 855. This option, of course, takes effect before a judge or
prosecutor gets their hands on a case. For a description of how judges try to utilize their power
when the case is finally before them, see Stephanie Clifford, From the Bench, a New Look at
Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/nyregio
n/from-the-bench-a-new-look-at-punishment.html [https://perma.cc/T4RB-XG47] (“[A]cross
the country, some judges are refashioning sentences, asking prosecutors to drop cases that
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For these reasons, I think Bellin overstates his conclusion about
prosecutorial power and how it relates to the power of other officials. But I
will not dwell on that here. My goal is not to get into the “murky business”
of defining power.96 And it is less important for me to examine whether
prosecutors have the most power in our system than it is to understand how
their power can be utilized to assist reform. Even in his most skeptical
moments, Bellin notes that “[p]rosecutors are not powerless” and that
“virtually every criminal justice outcome can be traced to a prosecutor’s
decision.”97 And those advocating reform often recognize that prosecutorial
reform is merely a shortcut to addressing the problems of the criminal justice
system.98 As Emily Bazelon states, “[i]t’s still important to persuade
legislators to change the laws, elevate judges who care about fairness, and
create the conditions for first-rate defense work.”99 However, “we can stop
caging people needlessly right now if we choose prosecutors who will open
the locks.”100 Thus, considerations of prosecutors’ primacy aside, it seems
that many scholars would agree with Bellin’s assertion that “it takes a village
to incarcerate someone.”101 Even if prosecutors are “the engines driving mass
incarceration,”102 there are certainly other important parts of the vehicle.
D. PROSECUTORS AND OTHER CRIMINAL JUSTICE OFFICIALS

Still, I want to suggest there is something to worry about here. I noted
earlier that the contingent power of prosecutors is often obscured by
statements espousing prosecutorial dominance. And exactly who has the
most power in the criminal justice system is a tricky matter that we need not
get into. As I see it, however, what has the potential to undercut a progressive
prosecution movement is misleading rhetoric that suggests other actors are
judges see as unfair, considering how to reduce the long-term impact of old convictions, and
writing essays advocating change.”).
96
Turner, supra note 87, at 5 (“Defining power has long been a murky business.”).
97
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 212.
98
See, e.g., BAZELON, supra note 3, at xxxi (“While it would be nice if lawmakers and the
courts threw themselves into fixing the criminal justice system, in the meantime, elections for
prosecutors represent a shortcut to addressing a lot of dysfunction.”).
99
Id. at xxx–xxxi. Indeed, even President Obama’s proposal doesn’t depend entirely on
electing prosecutors. He also recommends that those concerned with the criminal justice
system vote “for mayors and sheriffs and state legislators.” Obama’s Full Speech, supra note
4 and accompanying text.
100
BAZELON, supra note 3, at xxxi (emphasis omitted). In this sense, Bazelon appears to
be in agreement with Bellin’s observation that “[i]t is hard to change a system, but easy to
elect a local prosecutor.” Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 174.
101
Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
supra note 30, at 837.
102
PFAFF, supra note 26, at 206.
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not integral to a project of criminal justice reform. Even if it were true that
prosecutors possess most of the power in the criminal justice system, the
power given to prosecutors is not accidental—it’s deliberate. When other
officials share a common goal with prosecutors, it often makes sense for them
to give control to prosecutors and permit prosecutorial decision making to
happen in the shadows. Because of their unique position in our system,
deferring to prosecutors is often cheap, efficient, and presents an image of
legitimacy. For these reasons, legislatures are willing to accommodate
prosecutors because expansive penal codes containing laws that are rarely
enforced make crime control inexpensive.103 Judges are willing to
accommodate prosecutors and permit broad plea-bargaining discretion so
they can manage large caseloads and rapidly secure convictions.104 And the
police are willing to accommodate prosecutors because, unlike most police
officers, prosecutors are formally trained in law and could reasonably detect
legal and evidentiary flaws that preclude prosecution and present the
appearance that their decisions are legally sound.105 With the “tough on
crime” agenda that prosecutors have traditionally pursued, it simply makes
no sense for other officials not to defer to them. No harm, no foul.
Now shift the settings. A progressive prosecutor disagrees with the ways
in which police officers stop and harass young black men in an effort to detect
public gun carrying.106 As a result, the prosecutor dismisses various cases107
to deter the police actions. If the police commissioner opposes the prosecutor
and determines public safety requires a continuance of this program, it is
unlikely that the police commissioner would defer to prosecutors. Instead,
what we would likely see is continued harassment of these individuals on the
streets, even if they are not ultimately convicted of a crime.108 Indeed, one of
these interactions may even lead to a police officer unilaterally shooting
103
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
551 (2001) (“Broadening criminal liability and raising nominal sentences make prosecution
cheaper.”).
104
Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1455, 1484 (2017).
105
Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 74, at 1246–47.
106
This is an altered example of Bellin’s depiction of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy
in New York City from 2003–2013. See Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at
193.
107
Since these stops do not often end up in gun arrests, most of them would be minor. Id.
(“As most of these stops did not uncover guns, the policing surge sent a wave of minor cases
(subway fare evasion, trespassing, marijuana possession) to the courts. From the outset,
prosecutors dismissed almost all of these cases, many of which would not stand up in court.”).
108
In some cases, by sitting in jail waiting for court-ordered dismissal, a defendant would
receive a similar punishment as they would have received had they been sanctioned for the
minor crime. Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 199.
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someone dead on the street. Although progressive prosecutors may reduce
the rate at which people are sentenced, without compliance from police
officers the movement may not do much to change the everyday racial
mistreatment encountered by persons outside of the courtroom.
Or, consider a situation where legislatures decide not to defer to
prosecutors. They may reduce prosecutor offices’ budgets, reduce the
discretion that prosecutors have in cases, or even—following what is done in
several jurisdictions—permit police officers to litigate cases themselves.109
Further, a legislature dissatisfied with the way a local prosecutor’s office is
handling cases could follow Pennsylvania’s example and give the State
Attorney General’s office concurrent jurisdiction over those cases.110
Similarly, a governor may reassign cases from a progressive prosecutor’s
office to another office that is not so progressive.111 And the DOJ—which is
staffed via presidential appointment—could pursue federal charges against
offenders who would ordinarily be prosecuted locally. The real issue with
treating prosecutorial power as unilateral is that it fails to realize the ways
other officials are able to diminish the power of prosecutors when they refuse
to defer. The power to create the problems does not entail the power to fix
them.
Thus, statements such as “prosecutors are the most powerful and the
most unregulated participants in the U.S. legal system”112 are not problematic

109
Id.; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Opinion, When the Police Become Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/opinion/police-prosecutorsmisdemeanors.html [https://perma.cc/G83X-PU4A] (“In hundreds of misdemeanor courts in
at least 14 states, police officers can file criminal charges and handle court cases, acting as
prosecutor as well as witness and negotiator.”).
110
See Michael Tanenbaum, New Law Gives Pa. Attorney General Power to Prosecute
Gun Cases Dropped by Philly District Attorney Larry Krasner, PHILLYVOICE (July 9, 2019),
https://www.phillyvoice.com/larry-krasner-philadelphia-act-58-pennsylvania-gun-cases-fopshapiro/ [https://perma.cc/9Y64-6W98] (describing a recent bill that gave the Pennsylvania
Attorney General’s office concurrent jurisdiction over gun offenses in Philadelphia, which
expires just after the completion of Larry Krasner’s first term); see also Smith, The
Prosecutors I Like, supra note 29, at 418 (“[T]he 30-plus ‘bad’ prosecutors Krasner got rid of
in Philadelphia have been snapped up by other nearby DA offices.”).
111
See Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 199 (discussing the Florida
governor’s decision to invoke a statute allowing him to “reassign cases for ‘good and sufficient
reason,’ and sen[d] Orlando’s death-eligible cases to a hand-picked prosecutor in another
jurisdiction”).
112
Paul Butler, Prosecutors’ Role in Causing—and Solving—the Problem of Mass
Incarceration, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2019, 11:38 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/prosecutors-role-in-causing--and-solving--the-problem-of-massincarceration/2019/04/19/d370d844-5c93-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html
[https://perma.cc/CQ77-WVSR].
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because they assume prosecutorial primacy.113 Rather, the depiction of
prosecutorial power as unregulated misstates its contingent nature and risks
grounding reform on principles that overlook how progressive prosecutors’
efforts could be thwarted by other criminal justice officials. If the progressive
prosecution movement is to be successful, it cannot assume that the
prosecutor is the criminal justice system. It must recognize the contingency
of prosecutorial power and the interdependency of various officials in the
criminal justice system.114

113
Indeed, whether prosecutors are the most powerful actor in the criminal justice system
may be unimportant when advancing an agenda that requires compliance from multiple actors
that do not have to defer to prosecutors. When analyzing prosecutorial power, reformists may
be better advised to focus on what is referred to as “power-to” rather than “power-over.” See
Archon Fung, Four Levels of Power: A Conception to Enable Liberation, 28 J. POL. PHIL. 131,
132–33 (2020) (discussing how a “power-to” analysis can enable liberation). Scholars’
disproportionate focus on the latter is understandable given the notion of “power” is often used
to examine relationships that produce domination and subordination (Marxists focus on the
domination of workers by capitalists; feminists focus on the domination of women by men,
etc.). Id. at 131. And it is true that prosecutors seeking to decarcerate and pursue racially just
policies can expect different kinds of resistance from other powerful actors. But the
appropriate measure of progressive prosecutors’ power will be their capacity to achieve
sustainable policy changes, not whether they get other criminal justice officials to bend to their
will. Cf. supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (discussing exaggerated claims about
prosecutorial power that state prosecutors hold most, if not all, of the power in the criminal
justice system and answer to no one). Perhaps even less important is whether another
individual has a bigger impact on the criminal justice system when it remains the case that
those officials with a lesser impact could thwart prosecutors’ efforts at reform. Cf. supra note
1 and accompanying text (discussing the claim that local district attorneys have the biggest
impact on the criminal justice system). In an intricately interwoven system such as the current
U.S. criminal justice system, trying to isolate an individual as the most powerful actor may
prove to be a fruitless task for reformists.
114
It is worth distinguishing the contingent power discussed in this section from a trivial
sense in which prosecutors depend on other criminal justice officials to achieve their goals.
As with many complex organizations, the criminal justice system depends on many agents
whose causal powers affect outcomes. Consider, for example, Bellin’s claim that “[a]ll
prosecutors can do by themselves is let people off.” See Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial
Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, supra note 30, at 857. There is a sense in
which prosecutors cannot even unilaterally “let people off.” The prosecutor may, for example,
need the assistance of a sheriff or correctional officer to let someone out of jail; or they may
need the assistance of the Clerk of Court to enter an order. Still, these types of causal powers
should be distinguished from the legal powers that grant criminal justice officials the authority
to frustrate the policies advanced by prosecutors. A judge who refuses to enter an order
terminating someone’s probation early because she disagrees with the prosecutor’s assessment
that probation is no longer necessary is merely exercising her discretion. See Samantha
Melamed, DA Larry Krasner Pitched Judges on Ending Philly’s Probation Addiction. Will
They Go for It?, PHILA. INQUIRER (updated Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/
news/philly-da-larry-krasner-probation-criminal-justice-reform-20190401.html
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In summary, prosecutorial power is often exaggerated. The sort of
power prosecutors possess is a contingent, not unilateral, power that relies on
other officials. Although this contingent power appears boundless when other
officials (who share a similar goal) defer to prosecutors, it is diminished when
these officials challenge them. This, however, does not mean prosecutors are
not, in fact, the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system. That
assessment would depend on how we define power. Still, any useful
understanding of power would recognize that the apparent power of
prosecutors fluctuates based on other officials’ willingness to submit to it.115
If the problem with the standard view is that it discourages our focus on the
traditional targets (legislators, police, judges) of reform, the problem with
Bellin’s view is that it undervalues the role prosecutors themselves could
play. Attention on prosecutors is critical because of their ability to “stop
caging people needlessly right now,”116 the legitimacy based on their elected
status, and the power they accumulated from other officials’ decades-long
deference that makes them appear as the “gatekeepers of America’s justice
system.”117 The upshot of all this is that reformists should move beyond the
assumption that prosecutorial power is unilateral and advance a goal that
simultaneously targets all powerful criminal justice officials. A prosecutor
with a tenuous relationship to other criminal justice officials (legislators,
police, judges, parole boards, etc.) may not be as effective as one who has a

[https://perma.cc/4K6U-A9UX] (discussing Larry Krasner’s letter to Philadelphia judges
“asking them to give a break to people who’ve done well under probation or parole”). A Clerk
of Court that refuses to enter an order for the same reason is simply not doing his job.
115
See Mark Berman, These Prosecutors Won Office Vowing to Fight the System. Now,
the System Is Fighting Back, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2019, 4:52 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/national/these-prosecutors-won-office-vowing-to-fight-the-system-now-thesystem-is-fighting-back/2019/11/05/20d863f6-afc1-11e9-a0c9-6d2d7818f3da_story.html
[https://perma.cc/TM48-KZWP] (“[Progressive prosecutors] vowed to change that system,
but the system is fighting back. Powerful figures—including lawmakers, governors, police
union leaders, fellow district attorneys and Trump administration officials—have been sharply
critical, with some saying progressive prosecutors are improperly using their roles to decline
charges and arguing that their policies will drive up crime rates.”). Some scholars, however,
have surprisingly suggested that prosecutorial power has remained relatively unchanged
despite reform-minded prosecutors adopting a more progressive agenda that is less punitive
and more critical of police. See, e.g., Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 5, at 497–98
(footnote omitted) (“In a small but noteworthy number of recent cases, elected prosecutors
made promises that not long ago might have been political suicide: less punitive policies,
greater vigilance against wrongful convictions, or more scrutiny of the police. But neither
prosecutorial power nor prosecutorial discretion has been significantly curtailed.”).
116
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
117
Marans, supra note 1.
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strong relationship with them.118 The point is not that reformists should not
continue to push for progressive prosecutors. The point is that reformists
should appreciate the importance of other criminal justice officials as they
continue to advance reform.
III: PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE
But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. All of this talk about the power of
progressive prosecutors is only helpful if the policies reformists advance are
actually desirable. I now want to challenge a second assumption that
advocates of progressive prosecution appear to hold:119 that black Americans
would be the beneficiaries of the reform progressive prosecutors advance.
It is not hard to understand the idea behind the thought. If black
Americans bear the biggest burden of our current broken system of criminal
justice, it seems that black Americans would be the biggest beneficiaries of
efforts to fix the system. But surely the picture is more complicated than that.
Even if prosecutorial reform is successful (and other criminal justice officials
comply with their policies), are the aims advanced by progressive
prosecutors likely to right the racial wrongs of our criminal justice system?
I am doubtful. Many of the aims frequently articulated by progressive
prosecutors appear to contain tools that are just as likely to exacerbate racial
inequalities in our criminal justice system.120 My goal here is to identify some
118
For this reason, the search for “progressive judges” seems apt. See, e.g., Maura Ewing,
The Search for Progressive Judges, ATLANTIC (May 17, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2019/05/progressive-prosecutors-judges/589222/ [https://perma.cc/7LBD8KXC]. It is true that district attorneys are sometimes successful in their battles against judges.
See Commonwealth v. Webber, No. SJ-2019-0366, 2019 WL 4263308, at *1 (Mass. Sept. 9,
2019) (District Attorney Rachel Rollins wins judgment against a judge who refused to accept
the entry of a nolle prosequi.). But it often takes other judges to affirm those rights. See id.
(decision by Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overturning lower court judge).
119
See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text; see also Davis, Prosecution and Race,
supra note 19, at 17–18 (“Prosecutors, more than any other official[] in the system, have the
power, discretion, and responsibility to remedy the discriminatory treatment of African
Americans in the criminal justice process.”).
120
This is not to say that all self-identified progressive prosecutors care about racial
justice. The term “progressive prosecutor” is currently en vogue, and several (current and
former) prosecutors identify as progressive prosecutors even when others are reluctant to give
them the label. See, e.g., Steven Greenhut, Opinion, Kamala Harris Reimagines Herself as a
‘Progressive Prosecutor’, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Jul. 5, 2019, 6:00 PM), .https://www.ocregister
.com/2019/07/05/kamala-harris-reimagines-herself-as-a-progressive-prosecutor/..
Still,
attention to alleviating the racial disparities is considered a guiding principle for progressive
prosecutors. See 21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(December 2, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/21-principl
es-21st-century-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/N2B8-NZRZ] (recommending that prosecutors
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vulnerabilities of the policies espoused by progressive prosecutors, thereby
helping the movement avoid similar traps as other reform movements.121
Although the issues below are not comprehensive, they raise important
concerns to think about as the movement progresses. A survey of policies
advanced by progressive prosecutors shows that prosecutorial reform may be
counterproductive if reducing racial injustice in the criminal justice system
is not explicitly part of the progressive prosecutor agenda. To avoid
perpetuating the current racial wrongs of our criminal justice system,
progressive prosecutors ought to develop a decarceration program that
actively seeks to advance racial justice and avoids asymmetrically harming
our most vulnerable populations.
A. DECARCERATION AND RACIAL JUSTICE

At first sight, it seems obvious that progressive prosecution would
alleviate the racial injustice in our criminal justice system. “[T]here are
unwarranted racial disparities at every step of the criminal process . . . . Black
men are six times as likely to be incarcerated as white men, and Latino men
are twice as likely to be incarcerated as white men.”122 In addition, for those
born in 2001, the lifetime probability of incarceration for black boys is
estimated to be 32%, for Latino boys it is 17%, and for white boys it is 6%.123
And the decisions from prosecutors—from charging, to plea bargaining, to
sentencing recommendations—“play a very significant role in contributing
to mass incarceration and unwarranted racial disparities.”124 Thus, it is
natural to think, as Professor Angela J. Davis tells us, “just as the power and
discretion of prosecutors have contributed to mass incarceration and racial
disparities in the criminal justice system, that same power and discretion may
be used to institute reforms to correct these injustices.”125
But let’s think more about this. There are multiple layers that we must
peel back to grasp what the progressive prosecution movement can and
cannot do within its frequently articulated aims. First, we need to distinguish
more clearly between when prosecutors are seeking to correct mass
make it part of their office’s mission to address racial disparities). And scholars appear to
believe that it is central to the progressive prosecutor agenda. See Davis, Reimagining
Prosecution, supra note 6, at 22 (“Progressive prosecutors are committed to reducing mass
incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal justice system.”).
121
Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 14, at 1425.
122
Davis, Reimagining Prosecution, supra note 6, at 3.
123
Adam Tooze, Quantifying Incarceration, JACOBIN (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.jacobi
nmag.com/2017/11/mass-incarceration-statistics-united-states
[https://perma.cc/FG668MB9].
124
Davis, Reimagining Prosecution, supra note 6, at 4.
125
Id. at 5.
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incarceration and when they are seeking to correct racial injustice. Although
there is some overlap between the two,126 they also come apart. For example,
one could implement policies that decarcerate the population without
addressing any of the structural racism on which our criminal justice system
is built. Indeed, as Professor Marie Gottschalk has pointed out, “[m]ajor
decarcerations” in other countries “were the result of comprehensive changes
in penal policy over the short term, not sustained attacks on structural
problems and the root causes of crime.”127 As mentioned above, one of the
virtues of prosecutorial power is its potential for immediate change—
prosecutors can stop needlessly incarcerating people “right now.”128 Thus,
although it is true that “mass incarceration is an abomination that has
disproportionately harmed African Americans,” it may not follow that
decarceration would disentangle the “carceral state” from “the racial DNA of
the United States.”129 While not easy, cutting the number of persons who are
sent to jail and prison and reducing sentence lengths may be relatively
straightforward.130 But it may be much harder for prosecutors to correct the
use of state punishment to control black people that has been part of this
country’s identity for centuries.131 A prosecutorial reform movement should
not assume that eliminating mass incarceration would eliminate the racial
injustice embedded in the system.
The last point would not be too problematic if progressive prosecutors’
policies reduced mass incarceration while remaining neutral in its effect on
126

See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 94, at 2 (“As a criminal, you have scarcely more
rights, and arguably less respect, than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim
Crow. We have not ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.”); RUTH
WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 247 (2007) (“Racism is the state-sanctioned and/or extralegal
production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death. Prison
expansion is a new iteration of this theme.”); MUHAMMAD, supra note 7, at 226–77 (explaining
the “statistical link” between blackness and criminality); MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE:
A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 26 (2011) (“Many features of the criminal justice system
disproportionately hurt black Americans—racial profiling, the War on Drugs, bias and
stereotyping—but the worst damage is done by excessive imprisonment.”).
127
Marie Gottschalk, America Needs a Third Reconstruction: The Problem of Mass
Incarceration Is a Problem of High Inequality, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/americas-need-for-a-third-reconstruction/405799/
[https://perma.cc/4GNC-X4PH].
128
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
129
Gottschalk, supra note 127.
130
For a different take on this point, see JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 238 (2017) (emphasis omitted) (“[M]ass
incarceration . . . was constructed incrementally, and it may have to be dismantled the same
way.”).
131
See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
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racial inequality in the criminal justice system. Progressive prosecutors could
shrug their shoulders while proclaiming that all battles cannot be won at
once.132 It would be nearly impossible to significantly reduce the current
prison population without ensuring that some black people would be
released. Thus, as long as the policies advanced reduce the population of
black persons in the criminal justice system without increasing racial
inequalities in the system, then it would be hard to see why this movement
would not be considered a success.
But let’s unpeel another layer. When we look at some of the policies of
progressive prosecutors, it becomes clear that the movement may not even
remain neutral in its effect on the racial injustice in our system.133 Rather, the
policies advanced have the potential to undermine racial equality and
perpetuate racial disparities.
Take diversion, for example. Diversion programs are often thought to
be the “hallmarks of progressive prosecution.”134 They allow defendants the
opportunity to avoid incarceration if they meet certain conditions.135 Once a
participant completes the program, charges are dismissed, and the participant
avoids a criminal conviction and all of its collateral consequences.136
Diversion programs are a popular alternative for progressive prosecutors
because they provide community-based rehabilitation and conserve judicial
resources for what are often considered more serious cases.137 However,
“[e]very defendant charged with a misdemeanor or nonviolent felony [does]
not receive diversion.”138 “Eligibility is determined by a detailed assessment
of each defendant that includes an examination of his criminal record,
background, lifestyle, and other relevant factors.”139 Still, expanding existing
diversion programs is sometimes endorsed as a tool for prosecutors to fulfill

132

Cf. Anthony Ellis McGee, State’s Attorney Kim Foxx Explains Why She Needs a
Second Term, CHI. DEFENDER (Feb. 3, 2020), https://chicagodefender.com/states-attorney-kim
-foxx-explains-why-she-needs-a-second-term/ [https://perma.cc/G9G8-RV2X] (The article
quotes State’s Attorney Kim Foxx saying, “We are just scratching the surface . . . . I need
another term to continue to make those strides”).
133
For a nuanced account of the problems of the neutrality rhetoric when discussing
prosecutors, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 837 (2004).
134
Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 74, at 1239–40.
135
Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1081 (2016) [hereinafter Davis, Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty].
136
Id.
137
Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 74, at 1240.
138
Davis, Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty, supra note 135, at 1082.
139
Id. at 1083.
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their “ethical duty to seek justice and improve and reform the administration
of the criminal justice system.”140
It does not take much imagination to see how these programs can, and
do, perpetuate racial disparities in the criminal justice system. For starters,
“any discretionary screening decision in the American criminal justice
system raises concerns about racial bias and other pernicious factors.”141
Since diversion requires prosecutors to exercise their discretion, we are likely
to see the same bias and false beliefs that infect other areas of the criminal
process.142 For example, “[p]olls suggest that the majority of white people
think that blacks are violent.”143 And one’s potential to be violent is likely to
be one of the “relevant factors” considered when making a decision to place
someone in diversion.144 The likely consequence would be that those who are
white and viewed as if they “do not belong in prison” are offered these
diversion programs more often than those who are black and viewed as
violent.145 Although these disparities may largely be the result of implicit

140

Id. at 1081.
Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 74, at 1246; see also Alice Ristroph, The
Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 305, 327 (2018)
(“With discretion, of course, comes the potential for discrimination. It is all too well
established that police and prosecutorial discretion yield patterns of racially disparate
treatment, in which minorities are more likely to receive the greatest investigative scrutiny,
the most serious charges, and the heaviest penalties.”).
142
For a description of the ways prosecutors’ racial biases contribute to the racial
disparities in plea bargaining, see Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in
Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1231–38 (2018).
143
Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 14, at 1455; see also Traci
Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of Outcomes Among Men
Charged with Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST. 210, 215 (2013)
(citation omitted) (“[W]hen asked to match photos of criminals to the crimes they committed,
people match photos of Black men to violent crimes. These findings suggest that Americans
associate Black men not only with criminality generally but also with violence in particular.”).
144
See Schlesinger, supra note 143, at 228 (“Prosecutors divert very few defendants who
are charged with violent crimes and who have prior convictions.”); Laurel Eckhouse, Kristian
Lum, Cynthia Conti-Cook, Julie Ciccolini, Layers of Bias: A Unified Approach for
Understanding Problems with Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 185, 203 (2019)
[hereinafter Layers of Bias] (“Judges often worry about the risk of releasing someone (before
trial or via a shorter sentence) who goes on to commit a serious or violent crime, both because
they care about protecting their communities and because they worry about public backlash.”).
145
See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment,
27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015) (“The fact is, risk today has collapsed into prior criminal
history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race.”).
141
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biases,146 the outcome is the same: “unfair treatment of black and brown
people in the criminal justice system.”147
Moreover, a diversion program based on race-neutral policies would be
unreasonable if it fails to consider the effects that racial injustice had on an
offender’s prior arrest, charging, or sentencing. It is typical for diversion
programs to consider an offender’s prior contact with the criminal justice
system.148 And many prosecutors’ offices have diversion programs designed
for first-time offenders.149 But progressive prosecutors will likely confront
offenders who have prior offenses because of racially-charged policing and
prosecution from a prior administration. For example, they may find that
because of a previous stop-and-frisk policy in their jurisdiction, black men
have multiple prior contacts with law enforcement.150 Or, they may find that
because of the crack–cocaine disparity, the nonviolent drug offenders who
are black do worse on a diversion assessment because of the extended stint
they spent in prison due to unjust laws. Or, as the New York Times has
reported, it may be discovered that rather than serving as an alternative that
keeps people out of prison, “in many places, only people with money could
afford a second chance.”151 Those who cannot afford the fees typically
required to complete diversion programs—often poor, black people—often
end up in the state’s control for a longer period than they would have if they
146
It is worth pointing out that making the (likely white) administrators of these programs
aware of these unequal consequences may not remedy the problem. As Paul Butler notes,
research suggests that “[w]hen white people learn that criminal justice policies have an adverse
impact on blacks, it makes them support the policies more.” Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice
Reform, supra note 14, at 1455 (citing Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial
Disparities in Incarceration Increase Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1949,
1952 (2014)).
147
Davis, Reimagining Prosecution, supra note 6, at 5.
148
See Schlesinger, supra note 143, at 212–13.
149
Davis, Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty, supra note 135, at 1081.
150
See Layers of Bias, supra note 144, at 193 (“In a society structured by racism and
segregation, many variables commonly included in models, from location to employment to
prior police encounters, will be correlated with race.”); see also, United States v. MateoMedina, 845 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[P]olice are more likely to stop, and arrest, people
of color due to implicit bias.”).
151
Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance; No
Money, No Mercy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/
crime-criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PYT2-Q77M]; see also
Rebecca Burns, Diversion Programs Say They Offer a Path Away From Court, but Critics Say
the Tolls Are Hefty, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 13, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/diversion-programs-illinois-criminal-justice-system-bounceback-correctivesolutions
[https://perma.cc/3WPU-HGGV] (“There is concern, too, that long-standing disparities in the
criminal justice system between the poor and well-to-do will only grow, with wealthier
defendants able to pay to make criminal trouble disappear.”).
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served the full sentence for the offense they were accused of committing.152
The point here is that any neutral criteria used for these programs are likely
to exacerbate the problems that have already plagued black individuals who
end up in the criminal justice system because racial inequality is already an
essential part of it.153
If we keep unpeeling, we’re likely to find other illustrations. We may
find instances where efforts at reform extend beyond negatively affecting
black individuals and spread into black communities. For example, safe
injection sites permit prosecutors to treat drug addiction as a medical problem
that should be addressed with treatment, not incarceration.154 And although,
at this point, litigation has prevented these sites from being built in the United
States, it is expected that these sites will be placed in “the areas where the
greatest need exists.”155 Without conscious goals to avoid it, the likely
placement of these sites will be in poor, black communities where drug
distribution and drug use are known to occur. This may result in decreased
property value and other detriments for those living in these communities.156

152

See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 792 (2008)
(“[S]tudies found that the sentences for failing participants in New York City drug courts were
typically two-to-five times longer than the sentences for conventionally adjudicated
defendants.”); see also Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 74, at 1240.
153
Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 14, at 1445 (“Mari Matsuda
suggests that the law can create racial justice when it focuses on effects rather than neutral
principles.”). An additional worry here is that once white defendants are no longer at serious
risk of prosecution, the chances of getting legislative reform may decrease. See, e.g., Matthew
Lassiter, Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America’s War on Drugs, 102 J.
AM. HIST. 126, 132 (2015) (discussing how the prosecution of white Californians led to
legislative reform).
154
See David Sheff, Opinion, ‘Meet Them Where They Are’: Safe-injection Sites Should
Be Allowed to Protect Drug Users, USA TODAY (updated Jul. 22, 2020, 10:11 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/07/22/opioids-despair-drug-abuse-safeinjection-site-column/5482793002/ [https://perma.cc/YWJ4-ADCB] (describing how safe
injection sites reduce crime and save lives).
155
See Frequently Asked Questions, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/freq
uently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/KVF7-55DZ] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020)
(answering the question “Where will Safehouse be located?”).
156
See Alex Kreit, Safe Injection Sites and the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 413, 466 n.296 (2019) (citation omitted) (“[A]lleged risks [of safe injection sites]
involve mostly uniquely local concerns such as the possibility that they might ‘destroy the
surrounding community.’”). Likewise, the decision to not prosecute other “quality of life”
crimes may disproportionately affect these same communities, while those living in more
affluent neighborhoods may avoid the burden of decisions not to prosecute these crimes. It
may be true that arrests for quality of life crimes unduly affect black Americans who are
arrested for these crimes. At the same time, however, enforcement of many of these crimes
(including vandalism, car break-ins, etc.) may increase the quality of life for those living in
the communities where these offenses occur.
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Some more unpeeling may show that the proposed alternatives to
incarceration—such as electronic monitoring and other forms of
supervision—have a related, liberty-depriving effect.157 Rather than being an
adequate response to our system of mass incarceration, they simply serve as
a reminder that freedom isn’t free.
These programs and policies should exist. If we incarcerate those who
commit crimes, we ought to also attempt to address the underlying problems
that caused them to commit these crimes in the first place. And some of the
programs mentioned above attempt to avoid unnecessary incarceration.
However, as we move forward with these programs, we have to consciously
avoid placing the burden on the least well off. A decarceration program that
does not deliberately seek racial justice could be counterproductive and
perpetuate harms against black Americans.
B. PROSECUTORIAL LENIENCY AS A TOOL FOR INJUSTICE

There’s more unpeeling that we can do, but I want to jump straight to—
what some may consider—the core. Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of
focusing on decarceration without an eye on racial injustice is not that there
would be a continued overenforcement of prosecution in raciallymarginalized communities, but that there may be a disproportionate
underenforcement of prosecution in these communities. The worry is that our
justice system will repeat its “shameful history of states failing to protect
vulnerable populations from violence, placing in stark relief the ‘mattering’
of certain lives more than others.”158 Instead of serving as a reform movement
that creates justice for all, a progressive prosecution movement that
prioritizes mass incarceration without awareness of racial justice could
exacerbate—not alleviate—the disempowerment of the most vulnerable
populations of our society.

157
See Samantha Melamed & Dylan Purcell, The Probation Trap: Living in Fear, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/inq/probation-parole-pennsylvania
-philadelphia-criminal-justice-system-violations-poverty-20191024.html [https://perma.cc/6
ZB6-WH65] (documenting the problems of alternatives to incarceration in Pennsylvania); see
also Michelle Alexander, Opinion, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-reforms-racetechnology.html [https://perma.cc/M86X-ZNYK] (“[D]igital prisons are to mass incarceration
what Jim Crow was to slavery.”); Jay-Z, Opinion, Jay-Z: The Criminal Justice System Stalks
Black People Like Meek Mill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/11/17/opinion/jay-z-meek-mill-probation.html [perma.cc/AW6V-4TZH] (discussing the
traps of probation and parole on black people).
158
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1145, 1146 (2018).
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To modern observers this worry may seem unfounded. Our country has
the highest incarceration rate in the world.159 There are more than 2.1 million
people in prison or jail, and people of color make up 67% percent of that
prison population.160 Thus, a concern for the underenforcement of
prosecution seems peripheral to the problems that plague our system. Today,
we are more prone to worry about over-policing and over-prosecution in
marginalized communities, and the idea of more state involvement in those
communities seems highly undesirable.
This seems right. And by no means am I endorsing a position which
claims that “the principal problem facing African-Americans in the context
of criminal justice today is not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of
the laws.”161 Nor am I saying that statements about racial oppression in the
system are “overblown [or] counterproductive.”162 This is not the prevailing
sentiment from many black communities163 and scholars have pointed out
some of the problems with this view.164 Rather than claiming that black
communities need more enforcement currently, my point is that as we reduce
our incarcerated population we ought to do so in a way that does not
asymmetrically harm our most vulnerable populations. One of the
consequences of our unjust social system is that not only do blacks
disproportionately end up as defendants, blacks also disproportionately end
up as victims.165 Any progressive movement seeking to right the wrongs of
our justice system must note that certain crimes disproportionately affect
black people in vulnerable communities.166

159

Davis, Reimagining Prosecution, supra note 6, at 3.
Id.
161
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1994) (emphasis added).
162
Id. at 1255–56.
163
Davis, Prosecution and Race, supra note 19, at 66 (“African Americans led the fight
to change federal cocaine sentencing laws which discriminate against them. Numerous civil
rights organizations . . . fought to eliminate the sentencing disparities which discriminate
against African Americans. The National Black Police Organization, the Progressive Baptist
Convention, and the National Black Caucus of State Legislators—African American
organizations which represent vastly different constituencies—also lobbied to eliminate the
discriminatory aspects of the law.”).
164
See, e.g., Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1273–88 (1998) (criticizing Kennedy’s view).
165
See FORMAN, supra note 130, at 57–60, 223–24.
166
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 158, at 1152 (footnote omitted) (“Gun violence
disproportionately harms black men in vulnerable communities.”).
160
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There is a lot more that could be said here. Indeed, James Forman has
devoted much of his recent book to a similar subject.167 As Forman points
out, “African Americans have always viewed the protection of black lives as
a civil rights issue, whether the threat comes from police officers or street
criminals.”168 While declaring the simultaneous over- and under-policing of
crime the “central paradox of the African American experience,” Forman
notes that in 1968 “many blacks believed [that] ‘the police maintain[ed] a
much less rigorous standard of law enforcement in the ghetto, tolerating
illegal activities like drug addiction, prostitution, and street violence that they
would not tolerate elsewhere.’”169 As a result, the passing of many of the laws
that ultimately led to increased punishments of black persons were initially
celebrated as “a civil rights triumph.”170 The thought was that after decades
of ignoring the harm that occurred in black communities, the government
would finally provide “protection to a community so long denied it.”171
Attention to the harm that was plaguing the black community was a way of
showing that black lives matter.
If all of this is right, any decarceration program that does not make a
conscious effort to avoid the devaluation of black victims will contain the
potential to be abused and applied in a biased manner. We cannot forget that
leniency is sometimes regarded as the common way in which a state
expresses that black lives don’t matter.172 This point is often overshadowed
by calls to end mass incarceration. Indeed, the protection of black victims
does not make a single appearance in Sklansky’s “Progressive Prosecution
Handbook,” which is meant to provide suggestions for “chief prosecutors

167
See generally FORMAN, supra note 130 (documenting the role of black officials on
mass incarceration); see also, Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1715, 1717 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“Underenforcement can also be a form of deprivation,
tracking familiar categories of race, gender, class, and political powerlessness.”).
168
FORMAN, supra note 130, at 11; Tuerkheimer, supra note 158, at 1148.
169
FORMAN, supra note 130, at 35 (quoting THE KERNER COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 161 (1968)); Tuerkheimer, supra note
158, at 1148.
170
FORMAN, supra note 130, at 73.
171
Id.; Tuerkheimer, supra note 158, at 1149.
172
See CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE MAKING OF BLACK LIVES MATTER: A BRIEF HISTORY
OF AN IDEA xi (2017) (“It came as a surprise to some in America when, in the summer of 2013,
Zimmerman was found not guilty on all charges related to [Trayvon] Martin’s death . . . .
Thus, it was the death and failure of our justice system to account for the unnecessary death
of a black American that prompted three women to offer these three basic and urgent words
to the American people: black lives matter.”); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 158, at 1152
(“Impunity for police officers who kill African Americans arguably constitutes the most
powerful expression of the state’s disregard for the value of black lives.”).
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who want their offices to do a better job pursuing justice.”173 Even when
noting that progressive prosecutors should be attentive to racial disparities in
the criminal justice system, the focus is often on decarceration methods such
as decreasing racial discrimination in charging,174 monitoring the rate in
which prosecutors strike racial minorities from juries,175 being conscious of
an office culture that permits the casual use of racist language,176 and
including racial minorities as part of the prosecutor office’s staff.177 But what
I am suggesting here is that, if the goal is to achieve racial justice, these
proposals have the potential to do more harm than good. Many of the policies
advanced by progressive prosecutors may at once present a veneer of equality
while perpetuating some of the harms that these prosecutors were elected to
repair.
Don’t get me wrong—I like progress as much as the next person. But
the “perception of progress” created by reform efforts aimed solely at
decarceration may “mollif[y] communities of color and sap[] the energy
needed for a continued push for substantive equality.”178 If progressive
prosecutors want to achieve successful reform, a simultaneous attack on both
mass incarceration and the neglect of injuries to those in marginalized
communities must be central to their agenda. This dual approach to reform
would reduce the incarcerated population while achieving justice for all.
Thus, “if you are really concerned about how the criminal justice system
treats African Americans,”179 it is not enough to elect prosecutors who aim
to relieve mass incarceration and follow common scholarly agendas for
prosecutorial reform. Rather, those concerned with the variety of ways in
which the criminal justice system keeps its hold on black America should do
what they can to ensure that prosecutors promote an agenda that attacks
overcriminalization and deliberately “bring[s] racial justice to criminal
justice.”180

173
David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. ONLINE 25, 27 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook]. Of
course, Sklansky is hardly alone in this regard. See Abbe Smith, The Prosecutors I Like, supra
note 25, at 420 (discussing the “hallmarks of progressive reform [that] have been oft-stated”).
Spoiler alert: the devaluation of victims does not make an appearance.
174
Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 173, at 31.
175
Id. at 32.
176
Id. at 39.
177
Id. at 40.
178
Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 14, at 1467.
179
Obama’s Full Speech, supra note 4.
180
Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 14, at 1474.
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CONCLUSION
Confession time: although I have been criticizing assumptions
grounding the progressive prosecutor movement, I, too, have been operating
with a background assumption throughout this Article. I have assumed
reforming the criminal justice system is a worthwhile project. It may not be.
Given the insidious nature of criminal punishment and its role in the
subjugation of black people, many have concluded that the answer to
persistent injustice in criminal law enforcement is not reform, but
abolition.181 To imagine a more humane and just society, then, perhaps we
need to stop worrying about correcting the system and work to destroy it. “If
you are really concerned about how the criminal justice system treats
African-Americans,” one might tout, “the best way to protest is to work to
abolish the system.”
Perhaps. But I don’t think we’re there yet. Rather than viewing
abolitionism as a “contradistinction to reform,”182 I believe the more
promising views of abolition rightly understand it as “a gradual project of
decarceration, in which radically different legal and institutional regulatory
forms supplant criminal law enforcement.”183 Understood this way, reform
movements serve as part of that gradual project of dismantling oppressive
structures. Still, we have to be careful when presented with seemingly
promising reform movements that present immediate benefits; we don’t want
to take one step forward now, just to take two steps back later. Even when
endorsing progressive prosecutors, we should recognize the complexities of
181
See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND PRISON, TORTURE AND
EMPIRE 75 (2005) (“To focus more specifically on prison abolition, I see it as a project that
involves re-imagining institutions, ideas, and strategies, and creating new institutions, ideas,
and strategies that will render prisons obsolete.”); Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical
Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 471 (2018) (“In the anarchist gloss, the
abolitionist call is to get the state out of the lives of Black communities.”); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597, 1605
(2017) (“Approaching the democratization of criminal law as an abolitionist project means
releasing the stranglehold of law enforcement on black communities that currently excludes
residents from democratic participation so they have more freedom to develop their own
democratic alternatives for addressing social harms.”); Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary?
Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html [https://perma.cc/RN
G3-G5V7] (“Following an incarceration boom that began all over the United States around
1980 and only recently started to level off, reform has become politically popular. But
abolitionists argue that many reforms have done little more than reinforce the system.”). There
are, of course, many variations of abolitionism that are proposed to deal with these problems.
182
See Roberts, supra note 8, at 114 (“Yet abolitionist philosophy is defined in
contradistinction to reform: reforming prisons is diametrically opposed to abolishing them.”).
183
Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156,
1161 (2015); see also Butler, Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 14, at 1477.
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their power, the shortcomings of their proposed solutions, and their ability to
obstruct our advancements in racial justice.184 Only then can we really be said
to have made progress.

184

Chicago seems to be in better shape than many other cities on this front. After the
election of Kim Foxx, several groups—including Assata’s Daughters, Black Lives MatterChicago, BYP 100, and FLY—released a statement that included the following: As long-term
organizers, we are fighting for a world where prosecutors do not exist. We intentionally did
not endorse Kim Foxx because we intend to hold her administration accountable for how it
will explicitly impact the black community. Kim Foxx, and all members of government,
should take notice of how young black organizers are impacting electoral politics. Our rage
against the system and love for black people have dominated this year’s presidential election
and removed two prosecutors, Anita Alvarez (Chicago) and Tim McGinty (Cleveland) so far.
We are demonstrating that organized radical black love and rage can impact elections, and
ultimately institutions that disproportionately negatively impact black lives. Janell Ross, Black
Lives Matter Won on Tuesday. Prosecutors Lost., WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2016, 4:15 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/03/16/black-lives-matter-won-ontuesday-prosecutors-lost/ [https://perma.cc/RHC8-B4VL].

